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The unthinkable is probably inevitable. At some time in the future a terrorist 
group will detonate a nuclear explosive in a major metropolitan area. Nuclear 
non-proliferation regimes are not working. The earliest U.S. policies failed to 
prevent the U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, France, and China from developing 
nuclear weapons. Later policies failed to deter Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and 
India. They have not proven successful with North Korea or Iran and did not 
work in Iraq (unless you count invasion as an element of our non-proliferation 
policy). The few apparent successes (South Africa, Libya, etc.) can be attributed 
to internal factors as much as to the effects of non-proliferation activities. Once 
nuclear weapons are in the hands of unstable states or states that support 
terrorism, there is little doubt that one or more will ultimately wind up in the 
hands of non-state or state-supported terrorist organizations. Terrorist 
possession of a nuclear weapon will result in its use against a “highest-value” 
target – most likely a large city with major economic value, cultural and/or 
religious significance, and a dense population in which high casualties will result. 
 The likelihood of an attack has prompted considerable public debate about 
what are the best steps to prevent such an attack. In many of these discussions 
estimates of the number of casualties or the size of the area that would be 
damaged by an attack are used to reinforce the importance of action.1 Ironically, 
as discussed later, these estimates may evoke inaction in some critical areas. 
Paraphrasing many examples, they typically state: a Hiroshima-sized weapon 
detonated in a major metropolitan area will kill a million people or will vaporize 
everything within a half-mile of ground zero or some other equally dramatic 
claim (although some scenarios are less cataclysmic). To this author, the 
estimates do not ring true – they sound excessive. The estimates are often quoted 
or repeated by individuals who clearly lack technical expertise in nuclear 
weapons effects and original sources for the estimates are seldom cited. Although 
it is possible that some are the product of hyperbole used in political oratory to 
reinforce a point, the frequency is too high for this to always be the case. It is 
more likely that valid estimates made for a military attack scenario have been 
improperly extrapolated to the terrorist scenario. However, if the policymakers 
making such statements actually believe these estimates, then inaccurate 
information is being used to set policy, and something should be done to rectify 
the situation. Such “excessive” estimates have been used to establish emergency 
response planning guidance.2 It remains to be seen whether this will result in 
over-preparation or under-preparation. Neither is desirable. The primary 
purpose of this paper is to discuss the accuracy of common effects estimates and 
describe how more realistic estimates might affect nuclear terrorism 
preparedness. 
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STANDARD EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
The standard weapons effects prediction process occurs as follows. The desired 
type of nuclear explosive, its yield, and its height of burst are selected. The 
distances at which specific effects levels are expected to be achieved are estimated 
using relations derived from comparison of theory to measurements obtained 
during nuclear testing. Using these distances, areas are calculated that are 
associated with each effects level. The effects levels are then correlated with 
percentages of casualties. This correlation is somewhat subjective, but in the best 
cases is based on modeling that has been validated by the results from Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. Once a target has been selected, population density data, the 
calculated effects areas, and the casualty correlations are multiplied to estimate 
the total numbers of casualties expected. 
For purposes of example, we will assume that a Hiroshima-sized fission 
weapon (nominal 10 kT) is the most probable terrorist weapon. Slightly smaller 
or larger yields will not dramatically alter the results. Doubling the yield results 
in 22% larger blast damage distances and less than 49% larger areas (or 
casualties). Manhattan (New York City) is assumed to be the hypothetical target 
as it is arguably the highest probability target in the United States. It has the 
highest workday population density, it is the economic capital of the country, and 
it is a symbol of freedom and American might and prosperity. 
The “standard” analysis is an outgrowth of military effects analysis. Most 
experienced weapons-effects predictors learned their skills while addressing 
either global thermonuclear war or the tactical employment of nuclear weapons. 
Thus, virtually all examples used to guide novice or inexperienced effects 
predictors will be based on military analyses. With the exception of nuclear 
attacks on missile silos, deeply buried command centers, naval targets, and 
similar targets, an optimum altitude airburst is assumed in military nuclear-
effects analyses. The optimum altitude airburst is far and away the most common 
analytical assumption in nuclear effects analysis. As we shall see, this may be the 
source of the putative overestimates. 
The range at which each effect level occurs can be estimated from simple 
relations that scale with the nuclear explosive yield W (in kilotons, abbreviated 
kT). Scaling relations allow the experimentally verified ranges at which specific 
effects are produced for a reference explosion of known yield (typically 1 kT) to be 
extrapolated to the ranges at which those same effects would be produced by an 
explosion with a different yield. Hundreds of atmospheric nuclear tests at Nevada 
Test Site, Enewetak Atoll, and elsewhere have contributed to the verification of 
these scaling relations. The scaling relation for the distance (in meters) at which a 
specific overpressure (i.e., the pressure in excess of atmospheric pressure) is 
produced by air blast from the explosion is given by3 
  RXpsi (W) = RXpsi (1kT) W1/3       
where the scaling distance RXpsi(1 kT) for a 1 kT optimum altitude airburst can be 
shown to be  
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  = 2125 meters for 1 psi overpressure 
  = 1290 meters for 2 psi overpressure 
  = 700 meters for 5 psi overpressure 
  = 405 meters for 12 psi overpressure. 
These four overpressure levels are those used in the Office of Technology 
Assessment casualty correlation described later.4 The relation for distance (in 
meters) at which different levels of thermal radiation is produced by the 
explosion is given by 
 R2cal/cm2 (W) = 1180 W1/2 
 R8cal/cm2 (W) = 590 W1/2         
 R20cal/cm2 (W) = 375 W1/2  
The thermal radiation ranges are strongly dependent on atmospheric 
transmission. The values shown assume a perfectly clear day (no atmospheric 
attenuation). Ranges for hazy days will be shorter; the hazier the day, the shorter 
the thermal range. The relation for the distance (in meters) at which specific 
doses of direct nuclear radiation can occur is given by 
 R70rad (W) = 1200 + 500 logW       
 R300rad (W) = 950 + 500 logW       
 R800rad (W) = 800 + 500 logW    
Given a 10 kT airburst at the optimum altitude, the blast effects distances and 
their associated levels of damage are seen to be: 
 12 psi = 870 m for severe damage (steel-reinforced structures damaged) 
 5 psi = 1510m for moderate damage (wood/masonry structures 
destroyed) 
 2 psi = 2780 m for minor damage (wood/masonry structures damaged) 
 1 psi = 4580 m for light damage (windows shattered). 
The thermal effects distance from ground zero is: 
 2 cal/cm2 = 3730 m for first-degree skin burns (equivalent to a sunburn). 
 8 cal/cm2 = 1865 m for severe skin burns & ignition of easily flammable 
materials. 
 20 cal/cm2 = 1180 m for ignition of most flammable materials. 
The distance associated with direct nuclear radiation effects (assuming no 
shielding) is:  
 70 rads = 1700 m for the threshold of radiation sickness (mild 
symptoms). 
 300 rads = 1450 m for the radiation sickness lethal threshold (approx. 
5% fatalities). 
 800 rads = 1300 m for 100% fatal radiation sickness. 
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The next step in the analysis is to correlate casualties with weapons-effects levels. 
Although nuclear radiation and thermal radiation produce casualties, 
overpressure appears to be the best single predictor of casualty levels.5 The 
correlation used by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and summarized 
in Table I is often used. 
 
Table I.  Correlation of casualty levels with overpressure. 
 
 Peak Overpressure          Fraction of Population Density 
  (psi)       Dead             Injured           Uninjured 
   >12       0.98      0.02        --- 
   5-12       0.50      0.40      0.10 
   2-5       0.05      0.45      0.50 
   1-2         ---       0.25      0.75 
   <1         ---         ---       1.00 
 
Consider now a 10 kT airburst in Manhattan. The average daytime population 
density in the Central Business District (Manhattan south of 60th Street) is 
83,000 per square kilometer.6 The maximum local daytime population density 
occurs in the half-mile (0.8km) area around Grand Central Terminal7 and is 
approximately 330,000 per km2. Circular damage areas are calculated using the 
overpressure distances above. The areas are multiplied by the appropriate 
population densities and by the OTA correlation fractions to determine 
casualties. Details are summarized in Table II. Roughly 66 km2 are damaged, 
over six million people are directly affected, and total casualties are estimated to 
be in excess of 2,700,000. The areas and the casualty estimates determined in 
this fashion are consistent with those mentioned in the public debates. The injury 
estimates may be too high as the 1-2 psi area includes large portions of the 
surrounding rivers. 
 
Table II.  Casualty analysis for a 10-kiloton airburst over Manhattan. 
 
         DAMAGE          POPULATION    ASSOCIATED  
ZONE  RADII   AREA    DENS.     TOTAL   CASUALTIES 
(psi)  (km)   (km2)   (km-2)            ---   DEATHS    INJURIES 
>12  < 0.87    2.38  330,000      785,400    769,692            15,708 
5-12  0.87 - 1.51   4.78    83,000      396,740    198,370          158,696 
2-5  1.51 - 2.78 17.12    83,000   1,420,960      71,048          639,432 
1-2  2.78 - 4.58 41.62    83,000   3,454,460               0          863,615 
TOTALS 4.58  65.90  ---     6,057,560 1,039,110       1,677,451 
 
This traditional casualty analysis coupled with observations of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki presents a nearly “hopeless” picture. That is, one would expect that the 
southernmost one-quarter of Manhattan would be devastated. Roads through 
damaged areas would be impassable. Evacuation to mitigate fallout effects would 
probably be impractical in some areas. Power, water, communications, 
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transportation, and sanitation disruptions would extend well beyond the 
damaged areas. The expected number of injuries would exceed the number of 
hospital beds in the entire nation (approximately 945,000 in 2007),8 despite the 
fact that many of the casualties in the 1-2 psi area would not require 
hospitalization. A significant fraction of the first responders would be among the 
casualties. Many of the “injuries” might become “fatalities” due to inadequate 
medical care, shortages of food, and lack of shelter. The expected economic 
damage is severe, almost beyond comprehension. Economic repercussions would 
continue for years. 
If we assume the traditional analysis is what will always result, then a weak 
U.S. government might consider giving in to terrorist demands (if voiced ahead of 
time), rather than suffer the effects of such an attack. Since permitting such a 
catastrophic attack would be utterly unacceptable, actions likely to be taken to 
prevent anticipated attacks might further erode Constitutional rights. As the 
aftermath of such an attack is “hopeless,” planning for emergency response would 
probably be inadequately funded. Why prepare for something that is beyond 
accommodation, especially when there are always competing priorities for using 
available funds? Furthermore, since the Cold War has conditioned the public to 
view nuclear attack as the end of the world and the “hopeless” scenario does 
nothing to contradict this view, little or no personal preparation will be made for 
self-preservation and survival. Inadequate planning and preparation at all levels 
would greatly magnify the effects of an attack when it comes. This must be 
avoided. 
NONTRADITIONAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS     
At this point it is worth injecting an additional dose of reality. That is, the 
heuristics for predicting airburst casualties presented in the preceding section 
(and used by the most vocal predictors) are applicable only to optimum altitude 
airbursts. Thus, the damage and casualty analysis is realistic only for an optimum 
altitude airburst. Although the underlying theory is valid for other types of bursts, 
the numbers are not. There are fundamental differences between an airburst and 
a surface burst (Figure 1). Airbursts affect every structure separately; surface 
bursts affect structures sequentially. Airburst blast waves reflect off the surface, 
increasing the damaging overpressure; surface bursts do not produce such 
reflections. The optimum altitude also scales as W1/3, and for a 10 kT device is 
670 meters (twice as tall as the highest buildings) if optimized for 5 psi 
overpressure. Thus, detonation at the top of a tall building will not produce the 
optimum airburst effects, although the effects produced will be larger than those 
for a surface burst. Only an aircraft-delivered bomb, cruise missile, or ballistic 
missile can produce an optimum altitude airburst. For a variety of reasons, we 
anticipate that terrorist attacks are more likely to use a surface burst than an 
airburst. 
Terrorists are not state-operated military forces. A terrorist bomb is unlikely to 
be mounted on a missile. It is unlikely to be man-portable. It is likely to be large 
and heavy. Delivery by aircraft will probably require a multi-engine aircraft, 
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although aircraft of sufficient size are readily available in the general aviation 
community. If a policy of no overflight of downtown areas is established (or 
reestablished) and enforced, then an airburst can be made extremely difficult, if 
not prevented. Transport to the top floors of the tallest skyscrapers is difficult and 
likely to be detected. A policy of requiring access control and surveillance of 
elevators in all buildings taller than average, can further reduce this possibility. 
Given the severity of the threat and the utility of both aircraft overflight and tall 
buildings in potential delivery of chemical or biological weapons, consistent and 
effective controls of both should be implemented. Even if the bomb could be 
detonated on a tall building, the effects would be closer to surface burst levels 
than to airburst levels. Transport by truck, however, is relatively easy and difficult 
to prevent. Thus, it is more likely for a terrorist weapon to be detonated at street 
level than at the optimum airburst height. 
 
Figure 1.  Fundamental difference between an airburst over a downtown 




Airburst – Buildings provide little mutual shielding from blast.  Surface reflection 
enhances the overpressure. 
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Surface burst – Buildings provide significant mutual shielding from blast. Lack of surface 
reflection reduces overpressure. 
 
The same theory used to produce heuristics for airbursts can produce surface-
burst heuristics. These have also been validated by experiments at Nevada Test 
Site and elsewhere.9 These surface-burst values are valid for flat surfaces without 
significant obstructions (such as the dry lakes where nuclear tests were 
conducted). Surface bursts do not have overpressure enhancement caused by 
reflections. Thus, the blast damage ranges for flat-surface bursts are considerably 
smaller than for optimum airbursts. These heuristics are almost certainly 
overestimates for built-up areas (high-rise downtowns or even suburban 
environments). Nagasaki proved that hills cast “shadows” that significantly 
reduce nuclear radiation, thermal radiation, and blast effects. Casualties at 
Nagasaki were one-half those at Hiroshima where no hills interfered with the 
explosion. The presence of multiple massive structures one behind another 
should cast similar shadows that must reduce predicted damage ranges. 
Nevertheless, before we consider the effects of buildings, it is instructive to 
analyze the flat-surface burst scenario as a worst case that is much more realistic 
than the airburst scenario. 
Figure 2 shows the relation of burst height vs. range for different 
overpressures. The obviously larger ranges for airbursts are due to the fact that 
airburst shock waves are enhanced by reflections off the ground. Surface bursts 
over flat terrain are not similarly enhanced. Surface bursts over flat terrain will 
damage objects at considerably shorter distances than airbursts (e.g., 3800 feet 
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Figure 2.  The relationship between height of burst, distance from ground zero, 
and peak overpressure for a 1 kiloton nuclear explosion over flat terrain.10 
 
 
      
Scaling relations for effects levels can be obtained for surface bursts. These 
relations have also been validated by atmospheric tests. The scaling distances 
RXpsi(1 kT) are: 
  = 1170 meters for 1 psi overpressure 
  = 715 meters for 2 psi overpressure 
  = 450 meters for 5 psi overpressure 
  = 275 meters for 12 psi overpressure 
Given a 10 kT burst at a flat surface, the blast effects distances are seen to be: 
12 psi = 590 m for severe damage (steel-reinforced structures damaged) 
5 psi = 970 m for moderate damage (wood/masonry structures destroyed) 
2 psi = 1540 m for minor damage (wood/masonry structures damaged) 
1 psi = 2520 m for light damage (windows shattered). 
Blast damage distances are considerably smaller for the flat-surface burst than 
for the airburst. The relation for distance (in meters) at which different levels of 
thermal radiation is produced by the surface burst is given by 
Surface Burst Airburst 
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  R2cal/cm2 (W) = 845 W1/2 
  R8cal/cm2 (W) = 425 W1/2         
  R20cal/cm2 (W) = 270 W1/2  
The thermal radiation ranges are strongly dependent on atmospheric 
transmission. The values shown assume an extremely clear day (no atmospheric 
attenuation). Ranges for hazy days will be shorter. The relation for the distance 
(in meters) at which specific doses of direct nuclear radiation can occur is given 
by 
  R70rad (W) = 1200 + 500 logW       
  R300rad (W) = 950 + 500 logW       
  R800rad (W) = 800 + 500 logW  
The thermal effects distance from ground zero is: 
2 cal/cm2 = 2675 m for first-degree skin burns (equivalent to a sunburn). 
8 cal/cm2 = 1335 m for severe skin burns & ignition of easily flammable materials. 
20 cal/cm2 = 845 m for ignition of most flammable materials. 
The distance associated with direct nuclear radiation effects is:  
70 rads = 1700 m for the threshold of radiation sickness (mild symptoms). 
300 rads = 1450 m for the radiation sickness lethal threshold (appx. 5% fatalities). 
800 rads = 1300 m for 100% fatal radiation sickness. 
 
Using the same analysis technique as for the airburst, flat surface burst casualty 
estimates were produced and are summarized in Table III. Fatalities are 
estimated at 510,640 compared to 1,039,110, and total casualties are estimated at 
1,022,159 compared to 2,716,561. The reduction is significant (more than a factor 
of 2). However, the flat-surface burst ignores the fact that large structures 
attenuate blast effects.  
 
 
Table III.  Casualty analysis for a 10-kiloton flat-surface burst in Manhattan 
(without structures). 
 
          DAMAGE     POPULATION        ASSOCIATED  
ZONE  RADII   AREA   DENS.       TOTAL        CASUALTIES 
(psi)  (km)  (km2)  (km-2)            ---   DEATHS    INJURIES 
>12  < 0.59    1.09  330,000       359,700   352,506           7,194 
5-12  0.59 – 0.97   1.86  150,000       279,000   139,500       111,600 
2-5  0.97 – 1.54   4.49    83,000       372,670     18,634       133,350 
1-2  1.54 – 2.52 12.50    83,000    1,037,500              0       259,375 
TOTALS 2.52  19.95       ---      2,048,870    510,640       511,519 
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NONTRADITIONAL ANALYSIS CONSIDERING STRUCTURES 
Standardized and validated models for dealing with street-level explosions in 
built-up areas are not available. However, first-order models can yield 
considerable insight. The first model assumes that an explosion in the “canyons” 
of a city can be treated as a shallow buried explosion in rock that has a density 
equivalent to that of the average density of buildings, their contents, and the 
spaces in between. The buildings are the equivalent of the overlying rock. A 
nuclear explosion beneath but near the surface of the ground will produce a 
crater. Extensive test data exists for crater-forming explosions. The radius of a 
crater Ra in normal rock (e.g., granite, a standard material encountered in 
underground nuclear explosions) produced by an underground burst at the depth 
for producing maximum crater size is given by 
  Ra = 46W0.3 = 92 m (for 10 kT)       
The radius of the continuous ejecta layer surrounding the crater is given by 
  Re = 2.15Ra = 198 m         
Crater dimensions will scale as the inverse cube root of the material density. The 
density (mass per unit volume) of a “city” is estimated to be 0.1-0.03 times the 
density of granite. The air between the various thicknesses of steel, wood, paper, 
and concrete produces the lower density. For this range of densities, the scaled 
radii are 2.15 to 3.22 larger than for granite. Thus, the scaled radii for a “city” are: 
 - Crater Ra = 200-300 m 
 - Ejecta Re = 425-640 m 
 
Buildings inside the crater radius will be shattered and toppled. Buildings inside 
the ejecta radius will be damaged and possibly destroyed by impact of flying 
debris. Buildings outside the ejecta radius will receive little serious damage. 
A second model makes use of the fact that a blast wave cannot pass through a 
surface it cannot destroy. This is why a sturdy wall can protect one from a small 
conventional explosion on the other side of the wall. A wood frame wall can 
withstand overpressures of 1-2 psi. A masonry wall can withstand overpressures 
of 3-10 psi. A steel reinforced concrete wall can withstand overpressures of 7-15 
psi. In the steel-and-concrete jungle of a downtown area, it is a virtual certainty 
that a steel reinforced concrete wall will be encountered every 100 m or so. Thus, 
as soon as the blast overpressure has dropped below 7 psi, blast effects will be no 
longer be important. For the flat-surface burst the 7-psi level occurs at about 400 
m radius. Inside this radius this second model predicts damage will be severe; 
outside it will be light. 
A third approach assumes blast wave propagation through buildings is 
equivalent to blast wave propagation through a layered medium producing many 
small reflections that add up to a significant attenuation. That is, each external 
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wall, internal wall, room partition, or large object (bookcase, file cabinet, desk, 
credenza, etc.) in a building will reflect a tiny fraction of the blast wave. This is 
analogous to a light wave passing through a window. Most of the light passes 
through the window, but a small fraction is reflected. In the remainder of this 
analysis, all such substantial objects will be considered “walls.” After passing 
through one “wall” with reflectivity r, the overpressure is reduced by 
  Δp = Δp0(1-r)          
After passing through N “walls” with reflectivity r, the overpressure is reduced by 
  Δp = Δp0(1-r)N ≈ Δp0(R) exp[-rR/RW]       
with  
  N = R/RW           
where RW is the average spacing between “walls.” The average spacing between 
reflecting surfaces may be assumed to be 3-6 m (10-20 ft). The reflectivity of a 
“wall” will depend on the strength of the “wall” and the overpressure incident 
upon it. If the overpressure cannot overcome the strength then the reflectivity 
will be close to 1. For very weak walls the reflectivity might be 0.001 or less. Since 
the reflectivity coefficient cannot be easily determined, we assume the average 
reflectivity is 0.005-0.02. Without substantiating experimental evidence, these 
assumed values for reflectivity may be suspect. However, assuming a relatively 
low value for this factor is likely to result in an underestimate of the attenuation 
effects of reflections, the occurrence of which is a virtual certainty. Table IV gives 
the overpressure vs. radius for several choices of wall spacing and reflectance per 
wall.   
 
Table IV.   Blast overpressure attenuation by multiple reflections. 
 
     NO         r = 0.005  0.01             0.02             0.01 
RANGE           WALLS         RW = 3m  3m  3m  6m 
(m)                 (psi)             (psi)             (psi)             (psi)  (psi) 
380     30  15.9  8.4  2.3  15.9 
470     20   9.1  4.1  0.8    9.1 
590     12   4.5  1.7  0.2    4.5 
660     10   3.3  1.1  0.1    3.3 
970       5   1.0  0.2  0.007    1.0 
 
All choices result in: 
 Severe damage radii (12 psi) ≤ 420 meters 
 Moderate damage radii (5 psi) < 600 meters 
 Minor damage radii (2 psi) < 800 meters 
 Light damage radii (1 psi) < 1000 meters. 
 
The three unrelated models produce surprisingly similar results. Although this is 
not conclusive, it suggests that the results are reasonable approximations of 
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reality. Upon comparing the results of all three models it is reasonable to assume 
the following values: 
 Severe damage range is 400 m and produces 98% fatality rate and 2% 
injury rate 
 Moderate damage range is 500 m and produces 50% fatality rate and 
40% injury rate 
 Minor damage range is 600 m and produces 5% fatality rate and 45% 
injury rate 
 Light damage range is 1000 m and produces 0% fatality rate and 25% 
injury rate. 
A casualty analysis was performed using the ranges estimated for a building-
modified surface burst. Figures are summarized in Table V. Fatalities are 
estimated to be 213,675 with total casualties of 381,285. About 1 km2 will be 
significantly damaged. Note: street effects will increase these estimates slightly.   
 
Table V.  Casualty analysis for a 10-kiloton surface burst in Manhattan (with structures). 
 
            DAMAGE                 POPULATION              ASSOCIATED  
ZONE  RADII       AREA   DENS.      TOTAL    CASUALTIES 
---  (km)  (km2)  (km-2)          ---           DEATHS     INJURIES 
Heavy  < 0.40  0.50  330,000    165,000     161,700            3,300 
Moderate 0.40 – 0.50 0.28  330,000      92,400  46,200          36,960 
Minor  0.50 – 0.60 0.35  330,000    115,500     5,775          51,975 
Light  0.60 – 1.00 2.01  150,000    301,500            0          75,375 
TOTALS 1.00  3.14  ---      674,400 213,675        167,610 
 
 It is worth commenting that the OTA correlation of overpressure with casualties 
was based on airbursts over cities with limited high-rise construction. Given the 
nature of the elastic response of large structures (whipping motion) and the 
possibility of large overpressures occurring locally due to addition of many small, 
reflected contributions, the casualty correlations in modern urban settings are 
suspect. It is possible that casualty rates in the moderate damage and minor 
damage zones (nominally 2-12 psi overpressure) could be enhanced. This is 
another topic worthy of additional quantitative analysis and modeling. However, 
even if all of the population in the heavy, moderate, and minor damage zones 
were killed, the deaths would be a fraction of those predicted for the flat-surface 
burst (372,900 vs. 510,640). If that same pessimistic modified correlation (100% 
deaths for overpressure greater than 2 psi) were applied to the airburst and flat 
surface burst scenarios, their fatality levels would more than double (although 
injuries would be significantly reduced). Note: absent modeling yet to be done, 
there is no justification to assume the validity of this most pessimistic correlation. 
The three effects that are the dominant contributors to the devastation of a 
nuclear explosion are blast (addressed above), nuclear radiation, and thermal 
radiation. Since this analysis has concentrated on blast effects, some discussion 
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of the other contributors is in order. Most nuclear radiation will be emitted 
before the fireball expands appreciably. Buildings provide significant shielding to 
nuclear radiation. As little as 22 cm (9 inches) of steel or 82 cm (33 inches) of 
concrete will stop more than 99% of the direct nuclear radiation. Nuclear 
radiation is not expected to penetrate beyond the first ring of buildings (roughly 
100 m radius). The short range at which the nuclear radiation remains significant 
implies that nuclear radiation will not be a significant contributor to immediate 
casualties compared to the blast effects. Note: nuclear radiation is assumed to be 
a contributor to airburst casualties. 
Thermal radiation is emitted from the fireball (whose maximum size is roughly 
the crater size in solid rock). It is a dominant contributor to airburst casualties 
and may even produce a firestorm. However, buildings provide significant 
shielding to thermal radiation. Only glass permits penetration beyond the first 
surface (and then only of the visible/near infrared component of the thermal 
radiation). As a result, thermal radiation is not expected to penetrate beyond the 
first ring of buildings outside the fireball (roughly 300 m radius). The short range 
to which significant thermal radiation can penetrate implies that thermal 
radiation will not be a significant contributor to casualties compared to the blast 
effects. Thermal radiation may start fires among the debris and produce a 
firestorm, although this is seriously debated.11 Regardless, such firestorms will be 
confined to the areas of heavy damage in which we have already assumed the 
maximum fatality rates. Whether or not a firestorm occurs it will not significantly 
affect either the damage or the number of casualties produced by a surface burst 
affected by structures. This is not true in airbursts. A firestorm produced much of 
the damage and many of the casualties at Hiroshima. The area affected by the 
firestorm was almost identical to the area in which significant blast damage 
occurred.12 
Fallout is a serious concern and could conceivably produce more casualties 
than blast, thermal, and initial radiation combined. Its effects are not included in 
the OTA correlation and do not appear in the analyses presented above, for the 
reason that they can be reduced to low numbers by timely evacuation of the 
fallout zone. Fallout production will not be strongly affected by the presence of 
structures. The fallout will spread downwind in an oval pattern from ground zero. 
For a 10 kT surface burst and 15 mph wind speed, the unit time (1 hour) dose rate 
contours are ellipses given in Table VI.13 Most people within the 1 rad/hr contour 
would receive a total dose (integrated over months) in excess of 5 rem if they 
were not continuously sheltered and did not evacuate. Workers in nuclear 
occupations are allowed to receive up to 5 rem in one year, and higher doses in 
emergencies. Thus, the 1 rad/hr contour represents the minimum area that would 
need to be evacuated. Since the permissible exposure limit for the general public 
is only 0.1 rem in one year, regulations might require much larger areas to be 
evacuated. However, in a disaster of the magnitude considered here, it might be 
necessary to decide that a level considered acceptable for radiation workers is 
also acceptable for the general public. It should be noted that any amount of 
sheltering reduces the exposure levels considerably and should be considered in 
disaster planning. The primary effect of low-level radiation exposure is the 
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production of cancers. The excess risk of dying from cancer over a lifetime is 
estimated to be 0.08% per rem for acute exposures.14 An individual exposed to 5 
rem has an additional 0.4% chance of dying of cancer typically 20-30 years after 
exposure. This is statistically significant but small compared to the normal 18% 
chance of dying from cancer. 
 
Table VI.  Fallout analysis. 
 
DOSE       CONTOUR 
RATE         LENGTH          WIDTH            EFFECT AND 
(rad/hr) (km)   (km)  EXPOSURE DURATION  
1000  8.17  0.334     Median lethal dose in minutes 
300   20.4   0.96     Median lethal dose in a few hours 
100  40.3  2.43     Median lethal dose in a few days 
30  72.7  4.43     Acute radiation syndrome in a few days (<120 rem) 
10  109   7.6     Acute radiation syndrome unlikely (<50 rem) 
1   182   16      No acute symptoms; increased cancer risk (<5 rem) 
 
A surface nuclear explosion will also produce source-region electromagnetic 
pulse (SREMP). As with blast effects, models of SREMP generation by surface 
explosions in densely populated areas are not available. However, the source 
region for SREMP generation is the radiation deposition region. For a flat-surface 
explosion of 10 kT yield, the deposition region has a radius of about 1 km. The 
field strength falls off quickly with increasing distance from the source region. 
Significant SREMP field strengths extend to distances of several kilometers.15 
Megaton yields are required to produce significant SREMP at ranges of 8-10 km. 
The area affected by the SREMP will scale as the size of the source region. We 
have already seen that for the 10 kT explosion in a downtown area, this will be 
limited to a radius of 100-200 m due to the surrounding buildings. Thus, the 
reduction in size of the source region is expected to reduce the distance at which 
significant field strengths are encountered to less than 1 km. It is nevertheless 
possible that SREMP may be strong enough to damage highly susceptible 
components (computers are among the electronic items most susceptible to 
damage) at distances out to several kilometers, but this is not a certainty. Much of 
the energy in SREMP is radiated at frequencies less than 100 MHz. At lower 
frequencies, the steel frames and steel reinforcing of most buildings will provide a 
shielding effect with some reduction of SREMP field strength at any electronic 
devices contained within. This is why cell phone and television reception using 
in-unit antennas is often poor in modern buildings. SREMP (and blast damage) 
effects on electrical power lines are likely to cause a local blackout, but new grid 
control systems (installed to prevent repeats of the great blackouts of recent 
memory) should prevent cascading failures, and power should be quickly 
restored to most areas. Integrated damage from SREMP will be negligible 
compared to that from blast. Contrary to common belief, SREMP will not destroy 
electronics throughout the whole city.  
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If the nuclear explosive is detonated on a street (as opposed to inside a parking 
structure), then a line of sight will exist to the fireball for great distances along 
that street (or streets, if at an intersection) on which the detonation occurs. 
Because of funneling and waveguide effects, both blast and thermal radiation 
effects may extend along the streets to distances larger than the normal surface 
burst distances. Lack of shielding will expose objects on streets to the same levels 
of nuclear radiation expected in airbursts. The highest levels of damage will be to 
vehicles and pedestrians. Because dynamic pressure (blast wind) acts 
predominantly in the direction of shock wave propagation, only static 
overpressure can cause appreciable damage to the walls and windows of 
buildings fronting on the streets. Shock waves reflected at grazing incidence 
produce less than half of the overpressure produced by head-on reflections. The 
damage to the facing walls of these building will be much less than that 
experienced by those buildings directly impacted by the shock. Damage and 
casualties along streets should be minor compared to the damage near ground 
zero, but will not be negligible.  
The shock wave propagating outward from ground zero will diffract around the 
edges of buildings. However, the diffracted shock wave will be significantly 
attenuated. Once the shock wave has turned the corner, it will act like the earlier 
shock wave along the first street, but with much less strength. Diffraction effects 
should result in significantly reduced overpressure in the shadows of large 
buildings. Diffraction effects will cause limited damage to the front corners of 
buildings at cross streets. It is likely that damage along cross streets will be 
determined more by whether or not the shadowing building is destroyed than by 
the diffracted shock. Damage and casualties along cross streets outside the direct 
blast damage radius should be negligible.  
 
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table VI compares the results from the three analyses: airburst, flat-surface 
burst, and modified-surface burst. The differences in damaged areas and 
casualties are striking. 
 
Table VI.  Comparison of predicted airburst, flat surface, and modified 
surface burst effects. 
          FLAT       MODIFIED 
  EFFECT       AIR           SURFACE    SURFACE 
 Heavy damage    2.38 km2   1.09 km2 0.50 km2 
 Moderate damage    4.78 km2   1.86 km2 0.28 km2  
 Minor damage   17.12 km2   4.49 km2 0.35 km2 
 Light damage   41.62 km2 12.50 km2 2.01 km2   
 Fatalities              1,039,110    510,640 213,675 
 Injuries           1,677,451    511,519 167,610 
 Total Casualties      2,716,561 1,022,159 381,285 
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Contrary to the predictions of traditional analysis and experience of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, the more “realistic” analysis presents a picture that is much less 
dire. Fatalities are 20% of those predicted by the standard analysis, while injuries 
are 10% of those predicted and the damaged area is 5%. Much of the 
infrastructure will survive. Most evacuation routes will remain viable (permitting 
relocation for fallout mitigation). Food, water, sanitation, power, 
communications, and transportation will remain available to most of the city. 
Transportation to or from the rest of the country, especially air travel, is likely to 
be minimally affected. Airports are seldom located in the high population density 
areas that are attractive for casualty production. The first response system will 
remain intact. At most one or two police precincts and fire stations will be within 
damage zones. Only a small fraction of first responders will be among the 
casualties. 
The majority of the health care system will remain intact. Few hospitals, 
clinics, or potential shelter areas may be located within the small damage zones 
and thus will remain intact and operational. Few health care professionals will 
become casualties. Regional health care facilities (an estimated 60,000-70,000 
beds at three beds/1000 people) have the theoretical capacity to handle the most 
badly injured. However, most of the 60,000-70,000 beds are occupied during 
ordinary times and emergency rooms are almost always crowded. Diagnostics 
and elective procedures account for at least part of the occupation of beds and 
many emergency room visits occur in lieu of seeing primary care physicians. In a 
major emergency, many could be discharged by applying triage to those already 
at the facilities as well as to the victims of the explosion. Nevertheless, emergency 
treatment facilities will be stressed. This should be considered during planning 
for disaster preparedness, as well as in any discussions of generally improving 
national health care.  
Although horrific and highly stressing of existing resources, this scenario is 
nearly ideal for disaster response and relief by local, state, and national entities. 
Because structures and roads will be undamaged outside the immediate blast 
area, the effects of fallout from a single nuclear event can be minimized through 
immediate and effective response including fallout prediction and a combination 
of evacuation, sheltering in place and/or decontamination. Sheltering for as little 
as one day can reduce the fallout exposure to less than 20% of the maximum 
possible accumulated exposure at any location, even if the individual then elects 
to remain in the contaminated area. It can reduce the total exposure to less than 
1% of the maximum possible if the individual elects to walk out of the fallout zone 
(estimated to take a few hours at most). There is a place for renewed interest in 
civil defense. 
Such civil defense must have a personal emphasis, not just a governmental 
emphasis. An unprepared population will suffer needlessly in any disaster, 
manmade or natural. In general, those people most likely to survive are those 
who are prepared to survive and who will not wait passively for the government 
to save them. Government has been willing to educate people what to do to 
prepare for earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornados, although it could be more 
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aggressive in this education. It should do the same for terrorist attacks, especially 
in likely target areas.  
It is also important to realize that for any metropolitan area other than 
downtown Manhattan, the casualty estimates would be a small fraction of those 
calculated here. Hiroshima and Nagasaki both had downtown population 
densities of 10,000 per km2. Initial U.S./Japanese casualty estimates for 
Hiroshima were 68,000 killed and 76,000 injured and for Nagasaki were 38,100 
killed and 21,000 injured.16 Later Japanese estimates of casualties at Hiroshima 
are 114,000 killed and 78,000 injured.17 As there are reasons for the first set of 
estimates to be biased low and the later set to be biased high, some intermediate 
value is probably closer to the truth. Deaths occurring more than six months after 
the explosions (e.g., due to cancers) are not included. None of these estimates 
includes any military personnel or Korean “guest workers” that may have been in 
the cities and would have raised the numbers above those shown here.   
For comparison, the 1980 OTA estimate18 of the workday population density in 
downtown Detroit was 8600 per km2. If the modified surface burst casualty 
analysis of Table V were repeated for a population density of 10,000 per km2, 
then fewer than 6500 deaths and 7850 injuries would be predicted. Placed in 
perspective, these figures are comparable to the roughly 6650 people that die of 
all causes on any average day in the United States19 and only twice the roughly 
3000 dead and 6000+ injured in the 9/11 attacks. The United States has survived 
such disasters before and will again. Even if an airburst could be produced the 
estimated casualty levels would be 56,000 deaths and 200,000 injuries (and this 
is an overestimate because the 10,000 per km2 peak density is unlikely to extend 
over the entire 40+ km2 damage area of an airburst). Hiroshima had an average 
population density in the damage area of about 3300 per km2 while Nagasaki had 
an average population density of only 2300 per km2. An airburst in a city other 
than Manhattan is likely to be comparable to Hiroshima or Nagasaki.   
Some critics might contend that an airburst is the likely form of attack and 
surface explosions are irrelevant. However, it is many orders of magnitude easier 
to secure the airspace over a few large cities (and thus deter attempts at 
producing airbursts) than it is to secure the surface areas of those cities. All the 
former requires is the government’s will to enforce “zero overflight” zones with 
deadly force. Such enforcement should be established. Similarly, uniform and 
effective security measures for controlling access to the tallest buildings are 
practical and should also be established. Securing the surface against terrorist 
attack is probably not possible except in a few specific locations at a few specific 
times, such as special events.  
The promulgation of unrealistic estimates does the government and the 
general population a great disservice. People should not be persuaded to believe 
that a terrorist-initiated nuclear attack is the end of the world. We will probably 
experience such an attack at some point in the future and the world will not end. 
Millions will not be killed by a single event, although tens of thousands may. We 
will be forced to deal with the consequences. People tend to rise to the challenge 
in adverse situations, but they give up in situations perceived as hopeless. 
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Terrorist attacks, no matter how devastating, should not be made to appear 
hopeless. 
The government must not be forced by public opinion to take short-sighted 
actions, such as appeasement, to avoid such attacks. Appeasement seldom works 
in the long term and even appeasement will not prevent every possible attack. 
This does not mean the government should not act vigorously to reduce the 
threat of nuclear terrorism, but it should be proactive not reactive, and certainly 
not over-reactive. The public and especially public servants and elected officials 
deserve better education concerning the facts about weapons effects. Disaster 
planning should consider realistic and stressing scenarios but not doomsday 
scenarios. Emergency response capabilities adequate to address the threat of 
limited nuclear attack should be developed, and the nature of those capabilities 
should be communicated to the public.  
Although the models used above for surface bursts are first-order and do not 
take all possible phenomena into account, the author is confident that the effects 
for a real explosion will be much more limited than those predicted by the flat-
surface burst, and the flat-surface burst is known to be much less damaging than 
an optimum altitude airburst. Better models for nuclear effects prediction in 
urban environments may produce somewhat different estimates. Such models 
should be developed and made available to emergency planning groups. The 
models should include not only the effects on structures, but also estimates of the 
injuries and fatalities that might result. With realistic effects estimates as inputs, 
planning processes should produce better policies and response plans.  
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